S U M M A R Y A follow-up study covering two years after a closed head injury was carried out on a group of 57 young males. Their reaction time was tested on both a simple and a four choice visual reaction task. The group was divided into three subgroups according to length of unconsciousness after the injury. Reaction time discriminated between subgroups, and a highly significant improvement during follow-up was shown. Choice reaction time discriminated better and continued to do so throughout the whole period of follow-up. Some relations of reaction time with clinical variables and outcome are discussed. The choice reaction in particular seems to have some value for monitoring recovery and predicting final outcome.
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After cerebral concussion patients may show a slowness of thought which nowadays is usually described as a slowing down of information processing. This phenomenon should not be confused with the old clinical concept of "bradyphrenia," a state observed in subjects who have sustained very severe head injuries only. As Gronwall and Wrightson (1974) have shown, the slowing down of information processing can be demonstrated even in patients with mild concussions who have a good prognosis. They found a slowing down in a paced serial addition task during approximately the first five weeks after the injury. There are a few reports about prolonged reaction time after head injury (Norrman and Svahn, 1961; Miller, 1970;  Klensch, 1973; Gronwall and Sampson, 1974) . In most of these studies choice reaction time seemed a more sensitive test than simple reaction time, although this was not confirmed by Klensch (1973) .
The above investigations were carried out on small groups of patients who were tested only once. For that reason we felt the need for a longitudinal investigation on a somewhat larger group.
The main aim of our study was to construct recovery curves for simple and choice reaction times over a period of two years after the injury, using severity of injury as an independent variable. ' As it is a common clinical opinion that posttraumatic recovery may continue for as long as two years, it was decided to test patients six times in this period. The interval between tests increased regularly, as we expected to find the greatest changes in performance in the beginning of the recovery process. In fact, testing was planned at five weeks, 10 weeks, and five months after trauma, and from then on in the middle of each successive half year.
SUBJECTS
The sample reported on consisted of male patients in the age range from 16 to 39 years, and represented most of our total head injury population. This homogeneous group was divided into three subgroups according to the severity of the injury. Length of unconsciousness after the accident was used as an index of severity. Disturbance of consciousness is quantified in our department using a scoring system developed by the Neurosurgical Department in Glasgow (Teasdale and Jennett,performance (V) . It is regarded as an adequate way to define "coma" in a patient after head injury, using an EMV score of 8 or less as a criterion. Table 1 shows the number of subjects in each subgroup. Patients in these three groups will be referred to occasionally as mildly, moderately, or severely injured. As post-traumatic amnesia is another frequently used index of severity, a survey of its distribution in the present sample is given. All patients in the severe group showed post-traumatic amnesia for four weeks or longer, which makes them "very severe" head injuries according to the classification proposed by Russell and Smith (1961 (Benton and Joynt, 1958; Dimond, 1970) , this could have no effects on the mean reaction time of subgroups.
The panel was embedded in a tilted desk on which the subjects could rest their arms comfortably. Each test series consisted of 10 practice trials and 40 experimental trials. Each stimulus was preceded by a buzz as a warning signal, the foreperiod being one second. The interstimulus interval was five seconds. The total duration of the test was approximately 10 minutes. Although the effects of both practice and fatigue seem to be minimal in this time span (Benton and Blackburn, 1957; Costa, 1962; Bruhn and Parsons, 1971) and, if present, would work in opposite directions, we balanced the design for these time effects. In each subgroup, half of the patients started with the simple reaction while the other half started with the choice reaction. Reaction time was recorded in hundredths of seconds on punch tape. Individual reaction times were calculated in milliseconds by taking the median over 40 trials. The median is a better index for the central tendency than the mean, as reaction time distributions tend to be skewed. To test the overall effect of the independent variables, an ANOVA was carried out on the data, starting at the five months test (Table 2) . Between subject factor was the severity of injury as indicated by length of coma (three levels). 
Discussion
The main effect of "groups" indicated that reaction time can discriminate between grades of severity in head injury patients. Further, the effect of "occasions" suggested that recovery is reflected in decreasing overall reaction times. The highly significant effect of "complexity" is hardly surprising as it has frequently been reported in normal subjects also (Fitts and Posner, 1973) .
More interesting is the interaction between groups and complexity. There was an increasing difference between simple and choice reaction time with increasing severity. This suggests that choice reaction time is a more sensitive indicator of severity of injury as indicated by length of coma. Separate analysis of variance on each possible combination of subgroups shows that the interaction is caused mainly by the difference between the severely injured group and the other subgroups (P<0.01 in both cases). In the comparison between the mild and moderate group, the interaction approached significance (P=0.11). The disproportionate effect of the choice task on the severe group has been described as a complexity effect in an earlier report by the present authors (van Zomeren and Deelman, 1976) . This effect was found in a comparison of head injury patients with normal subjects as well as in a comparison of patients with varying severity of injury. In terms of information theory, the complexity effect indicates that head injury influences channel capacity, or rate of information transmission in the central nervous system. It is interesting that information processing capacity seems to be reduced in proportion to the severity of the injury.
The second interaction, groups X occasions, was also significant. In other words, the slope of the recovery curve differed for the three subgroups. The mild group showed hardly any change, the severe group showed a considerable decrease in reaction time, while the moderate group took an intermediate position. The (Fig. 2) . On the other hand, choice reaction is far more challenging because of its unpredictable nature, and for that reason may keep the patients well-motivated.
In a slightly different theoretical framework, the prolonged simple reaction time may be interpreted as indicating a state of under arousal, even in the mildly and moderately injured subjects. As Gronwall and Sampson (1974) have suggested, the head injury patient may be in a state of chronic under arousal, due to dysfunction of his brainstem. Kahneman (1973) 
